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Abstract
Although many cognitive models in anxiety propose that an impaired top-down control enhances the processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli, few studies have paid attention to task-irrelevant stimuli under a cognitive load task. In the present study,
we investigated the effects of the working memory load on attention to task-irrelevant stimuli in trait social anxiety. The
results showed that as trait social anxiety increased, participants were unable to disengage from task-irrelevant stimuli
identical to the memory cue under low and high working memory loads. Impaired attentional disengagement was
positively correlated with trait social anxiety. This impaired attentional disengagement was related to trait social anxiety, but
not state anxiety. Our findings suggest that socially anxious people have difficulty in disengaging attention from a task-
irrelevant memory cue owing to an impaired top-down control under a working memory load.
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Introduction
A tendency to selectively attend to negative information is a risk
factor for the development of anxiety [1–3]. Selective attention to
threatening stimuli increases state anxiety during stressful events
[4–7]. Cognitive models in anxiety propose that the attentional
bias is derived from impaired top-down control and enhanced
bottom-up attention [8–11]. Top-down control supports the
processing of task-relevant stimuli, whereas bottom-up attention
enhances the processing of task-irrelevant salient stimuli [12,13].
Since anxious people cannot enhance the processing of task-
relevant stimuli owing to an impaired top-down control, they
might direct attention to task-irrelevant threatening stimuli in a
bottom-up fashion. Many previous studies have revealed the
impaired top-down attentional control and enhanced bottom-up
attention for threatening stimuli in anxiety through both
behavioral and neuroimaging tasks [14–17].
The cognitive models of attentional bias could apply to not only
emotional but also non-emotional stimuli. That is, anxious people
direct attention to non-threatening, but salient, task-irrelevant
stimuli (e.g., a high-contrast flash) because of impaired top-down
and enhanced bottom-up attention [18–26]. For example, when
participants were required to process the task-relevant stimulus
among task-irrelevant distractors (e.g., a flanker task), anxious and
socially anxious people were strongly influenced by emotionally
neutral task-irrelevant distractors [20,21,23,24,26], and they
demonstrated an impoverished employment of prefrontal atten-
tional control mechanisms [18]. An impaired top-down control
might make individuals with anxiety direct attention to more
salient task-irrelevant stimuli.
The processing of task-irrelevant distractors depends on the
level of the load (e.g., working memory load) on top-down control
[27–30]. Because the working memory load disrupts top-down
attention, which controls interference by task-irrelevant distrac-
tors, visual attention to task-irrelevant stimuli is observed under a
working memory load task. The impaired top-down control in
individuals with anxiety might be influenced by working memory
load. However, few studies have investigated the effects of the
working memory load on visual attention to task-irrelevant
distractors in anxiety [31]. Considering the interaction between
top-down control mechanisms and visual attention, it is necessary
to clearly indicate how impaired top-down control can change
visual attention in anxiety and to clarify whether this impairment
attracts attention to non-emotional task-irrelevant stimuli under a
working memory load.
Previous studies have shown the effects of working memory load
on visual attention. When people hold information in their
working memory, they will direct attention to the task-irrelevant
stimuli matching the contents of their working memory [32–38].
In a study by Soto et al. [36], participants were instructed to hold a
colored object as a working memory task before performing a
visual search test (Figure 1). For the visual search task, participants
were required to discriminate a tilted line among several vertical
lines, all of which were presented among various colored objects.
Three conditions were created: the tilted line was presented in a
stimulus matching the contents of the working memory (valid
condition), the tilted line was not presented in a stimulus matching
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the contents of the working memory (invalid condition), and a
stimulus matching the contents of the working memory was not
presented (neutral condition). The authors showed that the stimuli
held in the working memory captured attention and that reaction
times (RTs) for the tilted target in the valid condition were shorter
than those in the invalid condition, that is, a cue validity effect.
Working memory enhances task-relevant processing and enables
people to focus on the target efficiently. However, people with
impaired prefrontal top-down control have difficulty in compart-
mentalizing their working memory, that is, keeping irrelevant
information separate from searching a template [37,39]. There-
fore, they direct attention to the stimuli matching the contents in
their working memory even if they are task-irrelevant, and the cue
validity effect is enhanced [32,33,35,36,38]. This task can
investigate the effects of working memory load on visual attention
to task-irrelevant stimuli.
For the present research, we examined the effects of working
memory load on visual attention to investigate whether impaired
top-down control will make socially anxious people direct
attention to task-irrelevant stimuli by using a paradigm put forth
by Soto et al. [36]. We focused on trait social anxiety because
impaired attentional control is strongly associated with trait social
anxiety [40]. Considering that people with an impaired top-down
control show a strong effect of working memory load on visual
attention to task-irrelevant stimuli [39], we hypothesized that
greater attention to task-irrelevant stimuli would be observed as
trait social anxiety increases. Attention to task-irrelevant stimuli
was divided into two operations: engagement and disengagement.
Recent studies have shown that individuals with trait anxiety have
difficulty particularly in disengaging their attention from both
emotional [41–49] and non-emotional stimuli [24]. Therefore, we
hypothesized that impaired attentional disengagement from task-
irrelevant stimuli would be observed in individuals with trait social
anxiety.
According to the attentional control theory of Eysenck et al.
[11], enhanced processing of task-irrelevant stimuli in anxiety was
observed under an increased load because top-down control was
more impaired. When working memory load increases, delayed
disengagement might appear prominently in individuals with high
trait social anxiety. Recently, Bishop [18] showed that high trait-
anxious individuals showed decreased efficiency of top-down
control under only low load but not high load [50], and she
insisted that these results were inconsistent with the attentional
control theory. However, she manipulated perceptual load, not
working memory load. According to the load theory [28,51], the
effects of working memory load and perceptual load on top-down
control are different. While increasing working memory load
disrupts top-down control, increasing perceptual load does not do
so, because the perceptual load affects limited perceptual
processing capacity rather than cognitive control [29,30]. There-
fore, high perceptual load in Bishop’s study [18,50] did not affect
attention to task-irrelevant distractors in high trait anxiety. It is still
unclear whether increasing working memory load enhances the
processing of non-emotional task-irrelevant stimuli in high trait
social anxiety. We manipulated working memory load by asking
participants to memorize one object or two objects. Top-down
control would be disrupted with the increased load task. As a
result, impaired attentional disengagement (i.e., delayed disen-
gagement from the memory cue) might be positively correlated
with trait social anxiety especially under high working memory
load.
Manipulating working memory load is also important for
investigating the effects of visual working memory capacity in trait
social anxiety. Attention to task-irrelevant stimuli is diminished
under high working memory load because of limited working
memory capacity [38,52,53]. High working memory load leads to
increased competition between working memory stimuli and
attenuates memory representations [12]. A recent study also
showed that the attentional network does not work if the prefrontal
cortex is preoccupied in maintaining several stimuli in memory
[52]. The results indicated that memory-matching stimuli did not
capture attention under high working memory load. If working
Figure 1. Sequence of the task under low working memory load.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047221.g001
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memory capacity is diminished in high trait social anxiety,
memory representations might be impoverished by competition
in working memory under high working memory load. In the
results, attention to task-irrelevant stimuli is diminished under high
working memory load. Although reduced working memory
capacity is considered to be associated with trait anxiety [54,55],
a recent study showed that individuals experiencing high trait
levels of social anxiety have high visual working memory capacity
[56]. Therefore, we hypothesized that even under high working
memory load, attention to task-irrelevant stimuli might be
observed in individuals with high trait social anxiety.
We also focused on the differences among trait social anxiety,
state anxiety, and other negative emotional states (e.g., depression).
Trait anxiety is considered a personality position, whereas state
anxiety refers to the current level of anxiety. Recent studies have
shown that impaired top-down attention is associated particularly
with trait anxiety while state anxiety is associated with increased
bottom-up attention to salient stimuli [8,9,23]. Considering that
the working memory load affects visual attention to task-irrelevant
stimuli in individuals with impaired top-down control, trait social
anxiety might predict delayed attentional disengagement. On the
other hand, state anxiety and depression might not predict
attentional disengagement.
Methods
Participants
The participants were 46 undergraduate students (11 males and
35 females) who provided informed consent. All reported normal
or corrected-to-normal vision.
Questionnaires
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE;
[57,58]). The BFNE Scale assesses apprehension related to
others’ negative evaluations and reflects the degree of trait social
anxiety. The scale comprises 12 items and uses a 5-point Likert
scale. The scale has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha= .92), and a test–retest reliability with a three-month
interval (r= .74).
Social Phobia Scale (SPS; [59,60]). The SPS assesses the
fear of scrutiny from other people, which is also a feature of trait
social anxiety. The scale comprises 20 items and uses a 5-point
Likert scale. The scale has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha= .91), and a test–retest reliability with a five-month interval
(r= .72).
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory-State Form (STAI-S;
[61,62]). The STAI-S was used to measure the degree of state
anxiety. The scale comprises 20 items and uses a 4-point Likert
scale. The scale has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s
alpha= .87), and a test–retest reliability with a three-month
interval (r= .80).
Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS; [63,64]). The SDS
was used to measure the degree of depressive symptoms. The scale
comprises 20 items and uses a 4-point Likert scale. It has high
internal consistency (Spearman-Brown split-half coefficient = .73)
and a test–retest reliability with a one-week interval (r= .85).
Stimuli and Apparatus
All stimuli were presented against a black background. In the
memory and memory-test arrays, participants were required to
focus on a fixation cross (with a visual angle of 0.17u60.17u) that
appeared at the center of a screen. The memory cue could be any
of the following: a circle, diamond, square, triangle, hexagon, or
second hexagon with a 90u rotation. All visual angles were
1.8u61.8u. The color of the cue was red, green, blue, yellow,
violet, or white.
In the visual search array, four colored objects appeared on an
imaginary circle at a fixation with a radius of 4.0u. Each object
could be positioned at one of eight possible locations on this
imaginary circle. Each stimulus was unique in color and shape,
and one line was located inside each colored object. Each line was
0.52u long and 0.12u wide. Among the lines, three were vertically
placed and the fourth (i.e., the search target) was randomly tilted at
15u either to the left or to the right.
The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor. The
experiment was programmed using MATLAB equipped with
Psychophysics Toolbox [65,66]. The viewing distance was about
60 cm.
Procedure
Figure 1 presents an example of an experimental trial. The
participants were seated in front of the monitor in a dim room. A
fixation cross appeared at the center of the screen for 400–600 ms,
and participants were required to focus on the cross. Following
fixation, the memory cue was presented at the center of the screen
for 100 ms in the memory array. Under low working memory
load, only one memory cue was presented whereas under high
working memory load, two memory cues were located 1.8u to the
left and right of the fixation. Participants were instructed to
memorize both the color and shape of the cues and to keep them
in mind throughout the entire trial. After a delay of 900 ms, the
search stimuli appeared on an imaginary circle in the visual search
array. Participants were instructed to discriminate the orientation
of the target and to press the appropriate key, using the left hand
for left-oriented lines and the right hand for right-oriented lines.
After their response, followed by a 500-ms interval, there was a
memory-test array. Under low working memory load, one colored
object was presented whereas under high working memory load,
two colored objects were presented. Participants were instructed to
indicate whether both the color and shape of the colored objects
were identical to those of the memory cues by pressing one of the
two appropriate keys. Under high working memory load, the two
objects were identical to the memory cues on trials involving the
same objects. However, on trials involving different objects, one of
the objects could differ in color, shape, or both from the memory
cue, whereas the other stimulus remained the same. The intertrial
interval was 500 ms.
After 24 practice trials for each load, each participant
completed 2 blocks (high and low working memory loads) and
108 trials per block. The order of the blocks was randomized for
each participant. There were three different types of trials in the
visual search array, each defined by the validity of the memory
cue. On the valid trials, the tilted target appeared within the
colored object identical to the memory cue under low working
memory load, and either one of the memory cues reappeared with
the tilted target line within it under high working memory load.
On the invalid trials, the memory cue under low working memory
load or either one of the memory cues under high working
memory load was re-presented in the search display but always
contained a non-target line rather than the actual target. On the
neutral trials, the memory cues were not present in the visual
search array, and the features of the stimuli presented in the array
did not match those of the cue. Trial type was randomly
determined, and each trial type had an equal probability of
occurrence. The participants were informed that only accuracy
would be examined in the memory task and they were instructed
to respond as accurately and as quickly as possible in the visual
Attentional Disengagement in Social Anxiety
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 October 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e47221
search task. At the end of the task, the participants were required
to complete all the aforementioned scales.
Analysis
Previous studies have shown that attentional engagement is
associated with short RTs in a valid condition compared with RTs
in a neutral condition, whereas attentional disengagement is
associated with long RTs in an invalid condition compared with
RTs in a neutral condition [67,68]. On the basis of these studies,
we calculated attentional disengagement from memorized stimuli
(i.e., RTs in invalid conditions – RTs in neutral conditions) and
attentional engagement to memorized stimuli (i.e., RTs in neutral
conditions – RTs in valid conditions).
Results
Visual search and working memory accuracies are shown in
Table 1. They were analyzed using a two-way ANOVA of validity
(valid, neutral, invalid) and working memory load (high, low).
Main effects and interaction were not observed in the visual search
accuracy (main effect of validity: F(2, 90) = 2.74, p= .07, g2p= .06;
main effect of load: F(1, 45) = 0.20, p..10, g2p= .01; interaction:
F(2, 90) = 1.21, p..10, g2p= .03). In terms of working memory
accuracy, the ANOVA revealed the main effects of validity (F(2,
90) = 5.20, p,.01, g2p= .10), and working memory load (F(1,
45) = 119.00, p,.001, g2p= .73). The interaction was not signif-
icant. The accuracy rates for the valid trials were higher than those
for the neutral and invalid trials (p,.01). In addition, the accuracy
rates under low working memory load were higher than those
under high working memory load.
We analyzed RTs in the visual search array (Figure 2). Incorrect
responses and trials where RTs were more than three standard
deviations from the mean were excluded. The average proportion
of outliers was 1.4%. We conducted a two-way ANOVA of
validity and working memory load. The main effect of validity was
significant (F(2, 90) = 152.79, p,.001, g2p= .77). There was also a
two-way interaction effect (F(2, 90) = 83.16, p,.001, g2p= .65).
The main effect of working memory load was not significant. A
Bonferroni-corrected simple effects test (two-tailed) revealed that,
under both high and low working memory loads, the RTs for the
valid trials were shorter than those for the neutral and invalid trials
(neutral: p,.001; invalid: p,.001) and that the RTs for the neutral
trials were shorter than those for the invalid trials (p,.001). The
important finding is that in the valid trials, the RTs under high
working memory load were longer than those under low working
memory load (p,.001), while in the neutral and invalid trials, the
RTs under high working memory load were shorter than those
under low working memory load (neutral: p,.001; invalid:
p,.001). If participants directed attention to the task-irrelevant
stimuli matching the contents of their working memory, RTs in
the valid condition became short and RTs in the invalid condition
became long. These results showed that increasing working
memory load decreased the effects of attention to task-irrelevant
stimuli. Under high working memory load, participants did not
direct attention to task-irrelevant memory-matching stimuli
compared to under low working memory load.
We investigated the relationships between trait social anxiety
and the effects of engagement with the memory cue (RTs neutral –
RTs valid), and disengagement from the memory cue (RTs invalid
– RTs neutral) in the visual search task. Table 2 shows the
correlations between the indices and each scale, as well as
correlations among scales. Positive scores of engagement and
disengagement indicate enhanced engagement to the memory cue,
and impaired disengagement from the memory cue respectively.
Only trait social anxiety (i.e., BFNE and SPS scores) was positively
correlated with the attentional disengagement index under both
low and high working memory loads.
We also conducted a multiple regression analysis to determine
whether trait social anxiety or state anxiety contributed to
attentional disengagement index in each working memory load.
Because BFNE is related to the cognitive function of trait social
anxiety, we used BFNE as an independent variable instead of SPS.
Under low working memory load, the model was significant (F(2,
43) = 4.30, p,.05, R2= .13). Only BFNE was a statistically
significant predictor of attentional disengagement (B= 4.58, SE
B=1.75, b= .37, p,.05). STAI-S did not predict the index
(B= 1.52, SE B=1.47, b= .15, ns). Under high working memory
load, the model was also significant (F(2, 43) = 4.35, p,.05,
R2= .13). BFNE was the only statistically significant predictor of
attentional disengagement (B= 3.45, SE B=1.18, b= .41, p,.01).
STAI-S did not predict the index (B= 0.11, SE B=0.99, b= .02,
ns). There were no indications of multicollinearity, with VIF values
,2 and tolerance 98.
We also divided participants into individuals with high and low
trait social anxiety in the upper and lower tertile ranges of BFNE
and analyzed RTs in the visual search array (Figure 3). Seventeen
participants (3 males and 14 females) had high trait social anxiety
(Mean BFNE score = 50.2, SD=2.6) and sixteen (4 males and 12
females) had low trait social anxiety (Mean BFNE score = 33.9,
SD=4.7). We conducted a three-way ANOVA of validity, working
Table 1. Mean Percentages of Accuracy Rates (Standard Deviations in Parentheses) in Visual Search and Working Memory Tasks.
Visual Search Task Working Memory Task
Valid Neutral Invalid Valid Neutral Invalid
Low Working Memory Load 99.6 (1.4) 99.2 (1.7) 98.8 (2.0) 95.6 (3.9) 94.0 (5.4) 95.2 (5.0)
High Working Memory Load 99.4 (1.7) 99.3 (1.9) 99.2 (1.8) 89.5 (6.2) 86.5 (6.9) 86.2 (7.2)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047221.t001
Figure 2. Mean correct RTs (ms) in a visual search task. Note.
Error bars represent standard errors. WM=Working Memory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047221.g002
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memory load, and trait social anxiety (high, low). The main effect
of validity was significant (F(2, 62) = 101.90, p,.001, g2p= .77).
We also observed significant interactions between validity and
working memory load (F(2, 62) = 56.24, p,.001, g2p= .65), and
between validity and trait social anxiety (F(2, 62) = 3.48, p,.05,
g2p= .10). The other main effects and interactions were not
significant. The interaction between validity and working memory
showed the same results as mentioned above. That is, in the valid
trials, the RTs under high working memory load were longer than
those under low working memory load while in the neutral and
invalid trials, the RTs under working memory load were shorter
than those under low working memory load. The important result
is the interaction between validity and trait social anxiety, which
showed that in individuals with high trait social anxiety, RTs
among valid, neutral, and invalid trials were significantly different
(all ps,.001) while in individuals with low trait social anxiety, RTs
between neutral and invalid trials did not significantly differ.
Engagement to the memory-matching stimulus was observed in
individuals with both high and low trait social anxiety. However,
only those with high trait social anxiety had difficulty in
disengaging attention from the stimuli, which matched the
contents of working memory.
The RTs in the visual search array in each condition (i.e., valid,
neutral, and invalid conditions) were not correlated with trait
social anxiety, state anxiety, or depression. The accuracy rates in
working memory array for each validity trial were not correlated
with the scales either. The performance itself for visual search and
working memory was not associated with trait social anxiety.
Discussion
The present study investigated whether socially anxious people
with impaired top-down control directed attention to task-
irrelevant stimuli under a working memory load. Because people
with impaired prefrontal top-down control have difficulty keeping
separate irrelevant information, they will direct attention to the
stimuli matching the contents in working memory even if they are
task-irrelevant [37,39]. The present study showed that as trait
social anxiety increased, greater effects in visual attention by the
working memory were observed. In particular, there was a delay in
attentional disengagement from the task-irrelevant stimuli
matched in the working memory among socially anxious people.
Even when working memory load increased, impaired attentional
disengagement in trait social anxiety was observed. Although
many cognitive models in anxiety propose that impaired top-down
attentional control enhances the processing of task-irrelevant
stimuli [8–11], previous studies did not produce an attention to
task-irrelevant stimuli under a cognitive load task in anxiety. This
study elucidated that trait social anxiety had an influence on visual
attention to non-emotional task-irrelevant stimuli that is identical
to that of a memory cue under a working memory load.
In the present study, the impaired attentional disengagement
from task-irrelevant stimuli was observed in trait social anxiety
under not only low but also high working memory load. This is
consistent with the attentional control theory, in which deficient
top-down control is greater with a high cognitive load [10,11,69].
Although some previous studies have shown that trait anxiety does
not have an effect on attentional control under high load [18,50],
they manipulated not working memory load but perceptual load.
The effects of working memory load and perceptual load on top-
down control are different [28,51]. Contrary to the effects of
perceptual load [18,50], high working memory load did not
exclude the effects of impaired attentional control in trait social
anxiety, but maintained theses effects. Manipulating working
memory load but not perceptual load is an appropriate way to
disrupt top-down control, which inhibits interference from task-
irrelevant distractors. The present results suggest that increasing
working memory load disrupts top-down control especially in
Table 2. Correlations between Attentional Indices and Scales.
Disengagement in
low load
Engagement in
high load
Disengagement in
high load BFNE SPS STAI-S SDS
Engagement in low load –.16 .28 .07 –.19 –.02 –.04 –.01
Disengagement in low load – –.01 .24 .39** .30* .19 .24
Engagement in high load – –.49** –.18 –.07 –.22 –.25
Disengagement in high load – .41** .38** .06 .29
BFNE – .60*** .11 .33*
SPS – .38** .61***
STAI-S – .60***
SDS –
Note. BFNE =Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; SPS = Social Phobia Scale; STAI – S = State Trait Anxiety Inventory – State; SDS = Self-Rating Depression Scale.
*p,.05,
**p,.01,
***p,.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047221.t002
Figure 3. Mean correct RTs (ms) in high and low socially
anxious individuals in a visual search task. Note. Error bars
represent standard errors. SA = Social Anxiety; WM=Working Memory.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0047221.g003
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individuals with trait social anxiety, and that they are unable to
inhibit the task-irrelevant distractors.
The impaired attentional disengagement under high working
memory load in trait social anxiety also suggests that individuals
with high trait social anxiety do not necessarily have a low working
memory capacity. According to previous studies, the effects of
task-irrelevant stimuli on visual attention are not observed under
high working memory load because of limited working memory
capacity [38,52,53]. If working memory capacity is reduced in
high trait social anxiety as the previous studies showed [54,55], the
effects of task-irrelevant stimuli might not be observed. The effects
of task-irrelevant stimuli under high working memory load suggest
that individuals with trait social anxiety have sufficient working
memory capacity. However, it is still unclear whether individuals
with high trait social anxiety have more visual working memory
capacity than those with low trait social anxiety as in a previous
study [56], because the working memory load in the present study
was not too high. Because the average visual working memory
capacity is three to four simple objects [70–73], two stimuli in the
present study might not totally deplete working memory capacity.
Previous studies also showed that the working memory load of two
stimuli was insufficient for the attentional guidance effect to
disappear, while the effect disappeared completely with more than
three stimuli in working memory load [38,52,53]. Future studies
should increase the stimuli in working memory load to evaluate
the effects of individual differences of working memory capacity in
trait social anxiety.
Inconsistent with our hypothesis, impaired attentional disen-
gagement was not enhanced in high trait social anxiety under high
working memory load compared to that under low working
memory load. Because high working memory load disrupts top-
down control more than low working memory load, individuals
with trait social anxiety might have difficulty in controlling
attention under high working memory load. One possibility is that
the low working memory load was enough to disrupt top-down
control in individuals with trait social anxiety. Even after
increasing working memory load, the effects of the load did not
change. The other possibility is that the present task underesti-
mated the effects of working memory load on visual attention in
trait social anxiety. In the present task, high working memory load
diminished the attention to task-irrelevant stimuli. Therefore, even
if high working memory load enhances the processing of task-
irrelevant stimuli in individuals with high trait social anxiety, the
effects might not be observed as, for example, long RTs in invalid
trials. Although the working memory load decreased attention to
task-irrelevant stimuli in all participants, attentional disengage-
ment index under high working memory load was not diminished
compared to that under low working memory load in individuals
with high trait social anxiety (low load: 87 ms; high load:82 ms).
The invariant disengagement index might reflect the strong
impaired attentional control under high working memory load.
Future studies should use different visual task to reveal the effects
of working memory load on attention in trait social anxiety.
We observed delayed disengagement rather than rapid engage-
ment, from the memory cue in individuals with trait social anxiety.
This is consistent with the findings of previous studies that showed
that people with trait anxiety and trait social anxiety had difficulty
disengaging from threatening stimuli [41–49]. In many previous
studies that showed delayed disengagement instead of rapid
engagement, a threatening stimulus was presented unilaterally
[41–43,49], whereas the present study presented several stimuli at
the same time. Because an abrupt onset of stimuli captures
attention automatically [74], these previous studies might have
underestimated the effects of engagement. In fact, when presented
with two stimuli at one time, individuals with high trait anxiety
rapidly engage their attention to a threatening stimulus [75]. In
order to reveal whether rapid engagement in trait anxiety, which
was not observed in the present study, is specific to emotional
stimuli, future studies should use emotional stimuli in a similar
task. However, the important point in the present results is that
impaired attentional disengagement in trait social anxiety was
observed not only for emotional stimuli but also for non-emotional
stimuli. This finding is in line with recent studies that have shown
that impaired attentional control in trait anxiety was observed not
only for emotional stimuli but also for non-emotional stimuli
[18,20,21,23,24,26], while few studies have shown the impaired
attentional ‘‘disengagement’’ for non-emotional stimuli [24]. The
top-down control mechanisms in trait anxiety might be generally
impaired.
We also measured state anxiety and depression for participants,
but these did not predict the effects of working memory load on
visual attention. According to cognitive models [8,9], trait anxiety
impairs top-down control whereas state anxiety induces bottom-up
attention to salient stimuli. Attention to stimuli matched in the
working memory is dependent on an impaired top-down control,
and enhanced bottom-up attention does not induce attentional
attraction [35,37,39,76,77]. Therefore, trait social anxiety, rather
than state anxiety, predicted the delayed attentional disengage-
ment in the present study. However, we only measured trait social
anxiety, and it is still unclear whether individuals with trait anxiety
also show impaired attentional disengagement under working
memory load. Moreover, considering that individuals with social
anxiety disorders have difficulty in attentional control [41],
impaired attentional disengagement might be observed among
them.
There was no association between performance in the working
memory task and trait social anxiety. Considering the impaired
top-down control in trait social anxiety, the performance might be
negatively correlated with trait social anxiety. According to
Derakshan and Koster [78], people with trait anxiety who have
an impaired top-down control can maintain a high performance
level (i.e., response accuracy), but at the expense of a reduced
processing efficiency (i.e., response latency). Our findings suggest
that accuracy rates in the working memory task were not reduced
by trait social anxiety.
The present study chose to manipulate the working memory
load on top-down control. However, top-down control includes
not only working memory but also many other functions such as
executive function and effortful control. The attentional guidance
from working memory also depends on several other top-down
controls [35,76,77,79,80]. Since valid, neutral, and invalid trials
were equally presented in the present study, it is difficult to
determine whether participants would voluntarily direct attention
toward the memory-matching item. Considering that all trials
were presented equally, participants might not voluntarily direct
attention to the stimuli that matched the content of WM.
However, to accurately assess the effects of voluntary and
involuntary attention, we need to manipulate the proportion of
valid, neutral, and invalid trials. If there were no valid trials,
participants could voluntarily inhibit the memory-matching items
[79]. The goal of attending to memory-matching stimuli might
also play an important role for the attentional guidance from the
working memory [80]. If individuals with trait social anxiety have
difficulty in voluntarily inhibiting information in working memory,
they might also show impaired attentional disengagement in
experiments void of valid trials. Future studies should investigate
which specific top-down controls affect trait social anxiety.
Attentional Disengagement in Social Anxiety
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 October 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 10 | e47221
In summary, we investigated the effects of impaired top-down
control in trait social anxiety on visual attention to task-irrelevant
stimuli under a working memory load. The ability of top-down
control deteriorates under working memory load and people
experience interference from task-irrelevant distractors. We
showed that as trait social anxiety increased, interference from
task-irrelevant stimuli also increased. Delayed attentional disen-
gagement from the task-irrelevant stimuli matched with working
memory was observed with an increase in trait social anxiety. Even
when working memory load increased, impaired attentional
disengagement in trait social anxiety was observed. Impaired
top-down control in socially anxious people might enhance the
processing of task-irrelevant stimuli under working memory load
and prevent them disengaging from the stimuli.
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